MYSTAGOGY: The Three Laws of Thought

Saturday, March 13, 2010

The Three Laws of Thought

The laws of thought are fundamental axiomatic rules upon which rational discourse itself is based. The three classic laws of thought are attributed to Aristotle. These three laws are samples of self-evident logical principles. Everyone should memorize these laws.

1. The Law of Identity (Whatever is, is.)

The law of identity states that an object is the same as itself: A = A.

"Being is."

- Parmenides the Eleatic (circa BC. 490)

"Now 'why a thing is itself' is a meaningless inquiry (for—to give meaning to the question 'why' — the fact or the existence of the thing must already be evident — e.g., that the moon is eclipsed — but the fact that a thing is itself is the single reason and the single cause to be given in answer to all such questions as why the man is man, or the musician musical, unless one were to answer, 'because each thing is inseparable from itself, and its being one just meant this.' This, however, is common to all things and is a short and easy way with the question."

- Aristotle, Metaphysics

2. The Law of Non-Contradiction (Nothing can both be and not be.)

The oldest statement of the law is that contradictory statements cannot both at the same time be true, e.g. the two propositions A is B and A is not B are mutually exclusive.

"It's plain that the same thing won't be willing at the same time to do or suffer opposites with respect to the same part and in relation to the same thing."

- Plato, The Republic

"It is not possible to say truly at the same time that the same thing is and is not a man."

- Aristotle, Metaphysics

"Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned."

- Avicenna, Metaphysics

3. The Law of Excluded Middle (Everything must either be or not be.)

The Law of excluded middle is the principle that for any proposition, either that proposition is true, or its negation is.

"It is impossible, then, that 'being a man' should mean precisely 'not being a man', if 'man' not only signifies something about one subject but also has one significance.... And it will not be possible to be and not to be the same thing, except in virtue of an ambiguity, just as if one whom we call 'man', and others were to call 'not-man'; but the point in question is not this, whether the same thing can at the same time be and not be a man in name, but whether it can be in fact."

- Aristotle, Metaphysics

"Every judgment is either true or false."

- Leibniz, New Essays

7 comments:

AnonymousMar 13, 2010 09:04 AM
Curious about why you posted this, John. Fr. John Romanides enjoys pointing out that these laws don't apply to the Divinity, or one's theosis. Thoughts?

In XC,

DB
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classicalworldMar 13, 2010 09:31 AM
DB,
You just used the three laws mentioned above in asserting your comment. Thoughts?

Joseph
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John SanidopoulosMar 13, 2010 11:09 AM
DB,

I can't recall anywhere in Fr Romanides reading that these three laws are refuted by Orthodoxy. If this were true, then we would be able to say that God is one essence and three essences at the same time, for example. Of course, this is a contradiction (and heresy), which is why the Fathers avoided such inconsistencies. In fact, if you read Fr Romanides carefully, he employs these three laws over and over again to reveal the inconsistencies in heretical and heterodox teachings, as do the Church Fathers, most especially St Gregory Palamas. So you see, the reason I posted this is because too many Orthodox think it is ok to deny these things, when in fact they are a part of essential human thought, and, as Joseph pointed out, you are even implying in your question.
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AnonymousMar 13, 2010 10:05 PM
My apologies for the lack of clarity in my post.

I was sincerely just curious about why you posted something so foundational (for lack of a better word). By analogy, had you posted the N-C Creed all by itself, without a handy dandy explanatory blurb in fine print above it, I would be equally perplexed about the reasoning behind your post.

Regarding Fr. J.R., he doesn't claim, nor do I claim for him, that Orthodoxy refutes the three laws; what I was referring to was his discussion in Patristic Theology of the inapplicability of the three laws to the human experience of God (theosis) or God-in-Himself. The three laws are only applicable in the realm of dianoia.

Hope that clarifies any confusion I may have sown on that front.

Anyway, in what context, or regarding what subject, do these Orthodox deny the three laws of thought? Isn't this a straightforward dianoia/noesis issue? What's the problem here?

In XC,

DB
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John SanidopoulosMar 14, 2010 12:58 AM
This post is about reasonable discourse. The problem lies in how to reasonably articulate without violating these three principles of logic.
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Edward WolffMar 14, 2010 05:13 PM
But there is logical inconsistencies in the essence/energies distinction and in the mode of existence of the Trinity (one nature, three hypostasis). Vladimir Lossky, for example, points out that the Christian believer should never try to "solve" these inconsistencies.
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John SanidopoulosMar 14, 2010 08:55 PM
I present this first of all as a philosophical issue, not theological. If I wanted to make this theological, I would have said so. Gregory Palamas himself took the Aristotelian line of viewing apodictic and dialectic argumentation as the proper way of settling philosophical disputes. Of course there are limitations to human reasoning, and one cannot arrive at a knowledge of God through human reason. It doesn't mean however that there are logical inconsistencies in how the Fathers described their experience of God. Usually where there are logical inconsistencies, there also you find heresy. Philosophy as a purely human science, but we must remember that Palamas refuted Barlaam for not employing Aristotelian logic in his theological arguments. He did so by appealing to the Fathers who did not refrain from using the term apodeixis or even sullogistikê apodeixis (syllogistical proof). Furthermore, in his Triads in Defence of the Holy Hesychasts, Palamas makes a significant concession:

"But if one says that philosophy, insofar as it is natural, is a gift of God, then one says true, without contradiction, and without incurring the accusation that falls on those who abuse philosophy and pervert it to an unnatural end."

The gift of reason, although capable of perversion (as in the case of demons, some pagan philosophers, and heretics), is in itself wholly good. Palamas, therefore, exhorts Christians to use their God-given intellects, without however making inflated claims for the scope of the human mind. And so, for Palamas, “there is something of benefit to be had even from the profane philosophers – but somewhat as in a mixture of honey and hemlock.” In statements about God, however, the Fathers forbid the use of dialectic.

And of course the reason I bring up Palamas is because he is known among the Fathers as someone who excelled in Aristotelian logic.

A lot more can be said on this, but I'll save it for the future.
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